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ABSTRACT. This study is a follow up of an earlier investigation concerning the 
effects of governance practices and investment strategies on public pension 
fund risk adjusted financial performance. Specifically, the inquiry uses three 
cross sectional national surveys of state and local government retirement 
systems to determine how governance practices in terms of system policies, 
board purview, and board composition impact abnormal returns. Results 
indicate that governance practices, particularly board purview over 
investment decisions, continue to have a direct negative impact on risk 
adjusted financial performance even after controlling for other factors. 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this study is to extend the work of Albrecht and 
Hingorani (2004) which examined the effects of governance practices 
and investment strategies on state and local government pension 
fund financial performance. In that investigation the researchers test 
the mediating theory of Useem and Mitchell (2000) who                       
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hypothesized, tested, and found that the relationship between 
pension fund governance practices and investment performance was 
essentially indirect via asset allocation decisions. Substantive 
similarities between the studies include a) identical sources of 
governance and total return data, b) similar measures for both 
governance and investment strategy predictors, c) comparable single 
period time horizons for their analyses, and d) the use of Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) in estimating coefficients for multivariate 
models. Substantive differences consist of a) the historical time 
periods under consideration for each study, b) statistical tests for 
mediation, and c) the definition and subsequent measure of financial 
performance. 
While Useem and Mitchell utilize total return as a pension 
outcome measure Albrecht and Hingorani follow Nofisnger (1998) in 
employing a separate “risk adjusted” standard defined as abnormal 
return. In the end, this latter difference emerges as the most 
significant as their pension outcome measure leads Albrecht and 
Hingorani to a conclusion different from Useem and Mitchell. In 
essence they found that while some evidence of a mediating data 
relationship did exist, governance practices continued to have a 
substantive direct impact on financial performance when controlling 
for risk. Their overall conclusion was that while direct and indirect 
governance effects are involved in the production of abnormal 
returns, direct effects essentially dominate the data generation 
process. 
Given the above, this paper extends the work of Albrecht and 
Hingorani in two ways. First, multiple time periods are examined as a 
panel data set instead of a single year. Second, in order to deal with 
multiple time periods, a cross sectional time series approach is used 
in place of OLS as a multivariate procedure. OLS has a number of 
shortcomings when estimating panel data and we seek to correct for 
these deficiencies. However, OLS results are presented in the paper 
as a benchmark for comparison purposes. 
The organization of the remainder of the article is as follows. First, 
the target population requirements and sample selection methods 
are discussed. Then variable descriptions, measurements, and 
relationships to financial performance are communicated before 
discussing the procedure and general hypothesis of the study. 
Univartiate, bivariate, and multivariate results are then presented.  
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The paper concludes by discussing the relevance of the study and 
noting public policy implications. 
TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
The target population requirements for this study have been 
previously detailed and are described here in brief.1 The target 
population may be broadly defined as all large state and local 
government pension systems in the United States and corresponding 
territories that fulfill the following requirements: 
- The system is comprised of plans offering defined benefits only. 
- The system is governed by a board of trustees or retirement 
board. 
- The system is open and investing system assets. 
Criteria one and two are invoked to remove influences emanating 
from outside decision makers such as defined contribution 
participants or external money managers that are hired to make all 
investment decisions on behalf of a system. The third prerequisite is 
intended to eliminate survivorship bias by excluding systems which 
are (a) not actually investing or (b) simply drawing down assets in 
anticipation of eventual termination. 
Systems responding to the Public Pension Coordinating Council’s 
(PPCC) 1997, 2000, and 2001 Surveys of State and Local 
Government Employee Retirement Systems were selected for a 
purposive sample. In discussing an earlier PPCC survey, Mitchell and 
Hsin (1997) state that “…there is no larger, more up-to-date, and 
more representative survey of state and local pension plans in the 
country; the federal government collects no centralized information of 
this type [though many have suggested it should] (p. 104).” The data 
for the 1997 and 2000 surveys are publicly available for purchase 
from the Government Finance Officers Association in an electronic 
format along with accompanying software packages titled PENDAT 
1997 and PENDAT 2000, respectively. The data for the 2001 survey 
are also publicly available and free of charge from the PPCC’s 
website.2 In most instances the data reflect fiscal year values. 
However, as discussed below, the dependent variable is measured on 
a calendar year basis. 
 The first survey contains pension information as of 1996 for 261 
Systems (GFOA, 1997, p. 2). Of these, 223 meet the target 
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population requirements given above. The second survey provides the 
same information regarding 246 public pensions as of 1998 (GFOA 
Research Center, 2000, p. 7). Two hundred funds are eligible given 
the parameters of this study. The third survey details similar 
information for 152 funds for 2000 (Harris, 2001, p. 3). Of these, 
126 systems are in accordance with the target population 
requirements. 
 Because of the potential cross-sectional correlation and timewise 
autoregressive properties of panel data, the analysis is limited to 
systems reporting the necessary information for all variables of 
interest in each of the three surveys (Nofsinger, 1998). This limitation 
leaves 81 pension systems with data for each of the three years for a 
total of 243 observations. 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES: VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS, MEASUREMENTS, AND 
RELATIONSHIPS TO FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Variable selection was determined primarily by a review of prior 
statistical investigations concerning state and local government 
pension fund financial performance. Specifically, the decision to 
include a particular governance practice in the study was generally, 
but not exclusively, based on the work of Albrecht and Hingorani 
(2004), Useem and Hess (2001), and Useem and Mitchell (2000). A 
notable exception exists in relation to whether or not the pension 
fund board has controlling authority over investments. Other 
empirical studies lending peripheral support for examining a 
governance practice include Munnell and Sunden (2001) and 
Mitchell and Hsin (1997). The decision to use abnormal return as a 
pension outcome measure was based on Nofsinger’s (1998) study as 
to the influence of economically targeted investments on public 
pension risk adjusted financial performance. 
Levels of measurement were determined by the type of response 
allowed for a particular PPCC 2001, 2000, 1997 survey question. In 
some cases previously examined governance practice variables were 
excluded from the analysis due to poor dichotomous splits which 
essentially restrict the sampling range.3 In other instances a 
particular governance practice was eliminated if the variable was 
either not measured or identically measured in each of the three 
surveys.4
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Financial Performance 
Abnormal Return 
Abnormal return was calculated by first creating a benchmark 
portfolio return for each system “i” for each calendar year “t”and then 
subtracting the benchmark return from the system’s total return (time 
weighted) for each calendar year. Following Nofsinger (1998), the 
benchmark return was constructed by weighting returns to various 
indexes according to the reported asset allocation of the system for 
each survey (Nofsinger, 1998). For example, the 2001 total return of 
a fund with reported allocations of 50 percent in domestic equities, 
40 percent in domestic bonds, and 10 percent in cash is measured 
against a 2001 benchmark portfolio of 50 percent in domestic 
equities, 40 percent in domestic bonds, and 10 percent in cash. 
Equation one below is a general result for the risk adjusted measure 
of financial performance: 
Abnormal Returnit = Total Returnit – Benchmark Returnit         (1)  
The asset classes and benchmark indexes used in the study are 
as follows:(a) domestic equities indexed by the S&P 500, (b) 
international equity indexed by the Morgan Stanley EAFE Index, (c) 
domestic fixed income indexed by the Lehman Corporate and 
Government Bonds Index, (d) international fixed income indexed by 
the Salomon Brothers World Government Bond Index, (e) cash and 
short-term securities indexed by the US Treasury Bill, (f) real estate 
equity indexed by the Wilshire REIT Index, (g) alternative investments 
and other investment indexed by the NCREIF Property index,5 (h) real 
estate mortgages indexed by the 15 year fixed mortgage rate.6
Governance Characteristics 
Investment Restrictions 
Various studies have investigated the effects of different types of 
investment restrictions on public pension investment performance. 
Typically the constraints have focused on three different aspects: 
required instate investment restrictions, use of prudent person or 
prudent expert rules in making investment decisions, and 
constitutional restrictions on investment practices. Until recently, 
investment restriction variables were generally introduced as controls 
for statistical investigations of economically targeted investment 
activity rather than for the strict examination of governance practices 
on financial performance. With limited exceptions, this latter aspect is 
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a rather recent trend in public pension research and overall the 
results are somewhat mixed. 
In examining the first type of restriction, Mitchell and Hsin (1997) 
found that pension systems which were required to devote a portion 
of their assets to state specific projects (e.g., to build stronger job and 
tax bases) earned lower total portfolio returns in the same period 
(e.g., 1990). However, the researchers do not replicate this finding 
statistically or substantively when using average total return over a 
five year period as a measure of financial performance. These results 
parallel that found in a more recent study by Munnell and Sunden 
(2001) who also found little evidence of consistent systematic 
explanations for instate investment (for either individual years 1991-
1997 or for pooled data) effects on total return. 
In terms of the second type of restriction Nofsinger (1998) found 
some evidence of a positive impact for systems implementing 
prudent standards in their investment practices on 1991 abnormal 
return. However, this finding did not persist over subsequent cross 
sectional OLS regressions of individual years (1991, 1992, 1993), 
nor did the result occur when the researcher used a combined 
sample regression technique. These results are similar to those found 
by Albrecht and Hingorani who use the 2000 survey and a series of 
OLS regressions to decompose the effects of governance practices 
and investment strategies on public pension fund risk adjusted 
financial performance. One possible explanation for the lack of a 
direct statistical link between prudent standards and financial 
performance is that all pension boards may de facto follow a variant 
of this policy (Mitchell & Hsin, 1997). 
When examining state constitutional investment restrictions 
Useem and Mitchell (2000) hypothesized and found that these types 
of constraints indirectly reduced total return via asset allocation 
strategies. Specifically, the investigators deduce that constitutional 
investment restrictions, all else constant, reduced equity allocations 
by 7.59 percent. Since equity strategies were determined to increase 
total return by as much as seven basis points the limitation was 
deemed to reduce this measure of financial performance. 
A remaining empirical question is whether these results hold a) 
across time and b) for a risk adjusted measure of financial 
performance. In this study, “constitutional investment restrictions” 
was chosen as the survey item of interest. The variable was 
measured as a dichotomous variable with one denoting the existence 
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of such a constraint and zero indicating otherwise. The general 
expectation is that constitutional investment restrictions exhibit a 
negative relationship with abnormal return.7
Board Purview 
According to Useem and Mitchell (2000) retirement system 
trustees are usually not professional money managers, and hence 
may be unfamiliar with the considerations that go into making 
investment decisions. “Still, some pension fund boards fix the 
allocation of assets among classes of investments, and some even 
take a direct hand in picking the investments” (Useem & Mitchell, 
2000, p. 497). Such inexperience may have a negative effect on 
financial performance and Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) do find 
some evidence of such occurrences when board members make 
asset allocation decisions. The PPCC’s 2001, 2000, and 1997 
surveys each include a consistent and single item for determining 
board authority in relation to investment decisions. In this study, 
“board purview over investment decisions” was measured as a 
dichotomous variable with one denoting use of the governance 
practice and zero indicating otherwise. 
Board Size and Composition 
Current research on corporate governance indicates that the size 
of corporate boards can affect company performance. For example, a 
study by Yermack (1996) suggests that boards with fewer directors 
achieve better financial results as firms with fewer members are 
more likely to dismiss ineffective Chief Executive Officers. Pension 
funds with smaller boards are hypothesized to display similar 
characteristics in dealing with their membership and thereby achieve 
higher levels of financial performance.8
In addition to board size, the composition of trustee membership 
might also be expected to affect investment performance. For 
example, Nofsinger (1998) finds some (inconsistent) evidence that 
direct agency costs exist when the interests of pension participants 
(through elected members) are not in line with that of taxpayers who 
are residual claimants of public pension fund surpluses and deficits. 
Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) also show that the percentage of the 
board appointed consistently reduces risk adjusted returns by 
approximately 2 basis points.9
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Each of the three surveys provides information for the variables of 
interest. Specifically, in this study, “board size” was measured as the 
total number of trustees on a pension fund’s board and the 
“percentage of board members appointed” was defined as (Number 
of Members Appointed/Total Number of Board Members) X 100. 
System Size 
In pension research assets are often used as a measure of 
system size, wealth, or other resources. Munnell and Sunden (2001) 
found that “large systems are likely to be more efficient in the 
management and administration [of system assets] and appear to 
earn higher [total] returns” (p. 159). To the extent that larger systems 
can capitalize on such efficiencies or economies of scale relative to 
investment activities the hypothesis here is that a positive 
relationship exists between system size and risk adjusted financial 
performance. In this study the measure was defined as an ordinal 
variable involving the following classifications: < $100 Million; $100 
Million - $999 Million; $1.0 – $9.9 Billion; and $10+ Billion.10
Portfolio Composition 
In terms of research, the proportion of assets invested in equity 
investments is often used to evaluate financial outcomes relative to 
total return. Reported results on state and local government pensions 
generally, but not always, indicate significant positive effects both in 
the short run and in the long run.11 These findings are consistent with 
general market conditions for the time period(s) being studied.  
However, Nofsinger (1998), who used abnormal return in a panel 
data analysis did not find a statistically significant positive affect in 
relation to equity investments. And, Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) 
found evidence of a negative impact on risk adjusted financial 
performance. These contradictory results did not support a clear 
expectation as to direction.12
PROCEDURE AND GENERAL HYPOTHESIS 
Prior to any form of examination, all variables were examined for 
accuracy of data entry, missing values, and fit between their 
distributions and the assumptions of mulitvariate analysis. 
Consistency checks revealed several reporting which are documented 
and illustrated in an earlier investigation.13 To improve pairwise 
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linearity and to reduce positive skewness and kurtosis the total 
number of board members variable was logarithmically transformed. 
In terms of analysis, first univariate statistics and simple counts 
were calculated. Then bivariate relationships between dichotomous 
governance practice variables and abnormal return were tested for 
each of the three surveys. Specifically, parametric tests were 
conducted to determine whether or not financial performance was 
different for systems (a) subject to constitutional investment 
restrictions, and (b) in which the board has controlling authority over 
investment decisions. In addition, simple correlation coefficients were 
calculated to examine the relationship of risk adjusted financial 
performance with continuous predictors. Finally, a multivariate 
analysis using a cross-sectional time series approach was used to 
examine the effects of governance practices on financial 
performance. The overall hypothesis was that governance practices 
have a statistically and substantive direct impact on the abnormal 
return criterion variable. 
Econometric Framework 
When dealing with cross-sectional time-series data, the error 
terms eit incorporate the influence of omitted variables. This leads to 
a violation of the classical assumption that omitted variables are 
independent of the included variables and are independently 
distributed. The omitted variables in the cross-sectional time-series 
data can be classified into three groups: individual time-invariant 
variables, period individual-invariant variables, and individual time 
varying variables.14
The individual time-invariant variables are variables that are the 
same for a given cross-sectional unit through time, but vary across 
cross-sectional units. Examples are different characteristics of each 
pension fund. The period individual-invariant variables are variables 
that are the same for all cross-sectional units at a given point in time, 
but vary through time. Examples are national economic growth and 
monetary policy that impact the performance of pension funds. The 
individual time varying variables are variables that vary across cross-
sectional units at a given point in time and also exhibit variation 
through time. A good example is the difference in size of assets 
across pension funds. Size of assets for each fund also changes over 
time. 
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To deal with the problem of these omitted variables, we estimate 
this data set by using a fixed-effect model and a random-effect 
model. The fixed-effect model assumes that the differences across 
units (e.g. pension funds) can be captured by the differences in 
constant terms. By comparison the random-effect model assumes 
that differences across units can be captured by parametric shifts in 
a regression function with a constant slope. In general form, the 
regression model in this study was specified as equation two below: 
ARit = b0 + b1 CONSTit + b2 BRDINVit + b3 LNBRDit + b4 APPTit + b5  
SIZEit + b6 TOTEQit + eit            (2) 
Where: 
       AR  =  Abnormal Return   
CONST =  Constitutional Investment Restrictions 
BRDINV =  Board Purview Over Investment Decisions 
  LNBRD =  Natural Log of Total Number of Board Members 
    APPT =  Percentage of Board Appointed 
     SIZE =  System Size  
TOTEQ =  Percentage of Portfolio in Equities 
           e =  Random Error Term 
           i =  The “ith” system for i = 1 - 81 
           t =  Time for 1996, 1998, and 2000, respectively 
In the results that follow ordinary least squares results are presented 
as a benchmark for comparison. However, the findings are not 
discussed as the technique has many shortcomings when estimating 
panel data. 
RESULTS 
Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 below details raw descriptive statistics for the 81 defined 
benefit public pension funds reporting in the 2001 survey. The 
contents include measures of central tendency and minimum and 
maximum values for total portfolio return, system size (market value 
of assets), and asset allocation patterns. The average rate of return in 
2001 was approximately 6.22 percent with a minimum of -3.80 
percent and a maximum of 18.90 percent. Reflecting positive skew in 
the distribution, the mean statistic for the market value of system 
assets is $11,429 million: more than 2.5 times the median estimate 
of $4,463 million. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Statistics of Pension Funds (2001 Survey) 
 Mean Minimum Maximum 
Portfolio Characteristics 
Portfolio Total Return 6.22% -3.80% 18.90% 
Market Value of Assets (millions) $11,429 a $2.30 $89,247 
Portfolio Allocation 
Domestic Stock 45.23% 0.00% 70.00% 
International Equity 12.26 0.00 25.67 
Domestic Bonds 30.34 6.90 75.00 
International Fixed Income 1.94 0.00 10.20 
Real Estate Equity 3.40 0.00 17.10 
Mortgages 0.72 0.00 15.00 
Alternative Investments 2.69 0.00 16.00 
Cash 3.18 0.00 25.00 
Other Investments 0.23 0.00 7.70 
Note:  a Median Statistic = $4,463 
 
The large variation in total return may be at least partially 
explained by the substantial variation in portfolio asset allocations. 
For example, while the average allocation to domestic equity is 
slightly more than 45 percent at least one fund allocated nothing to 
this category. Considering domestic bonds, all 81 systems allocated a 
portion of assets under control to this class in 2000 with at least one 
fund having placed nearly 75 percent of all assets in corporate and 
government debt. In terms of international equity, at least one system 
allocated over a quarter of total assets to this category. However, no 
system placed more than 10.2 percent of their portfolio in 
international fixed income. 
Table 2 below gives simple counts for the number of pension 
funds reporting a particular governance practice in the 2001 survey. 
Specifically, 11 systems acknowledged the existence of constitutional 
investment restrictions and 66 funds reported that the board has 
purview over investment decisions. In addition 38 funds have a board 
which is primarily composed of appointed membership while 27 
systems reported boards with above average levels of membership 
numbers. 
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TABLE 2 
Number of Systems with a Governance Characteristic (2001 Survey) 
Governance Characteristic Number Reporting (N 
= 81) 
Constitutional Investment Restrictions  11 
Board Purview Over Investment Decisions  66 
Boards with Majority of Members 
Appointeda
38 
Boards with Above Average Membershipb 27 
Notes: 
a  Minimum = 0; Maximum = 11: Mean = 3.51; Standard Deviation 
2.61. 
b  Minimum = 5; Maximum = 26: Mean = 9.35; Standard Deviation 
3.58. 
 
Bivariate Results 
Bivariate hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
governance practices and abnormal return were assessed in two 
ways for each of the three separate surveys: a) parametric t-tests and 
One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) were utilized for categorical 
explanatory variables, and b) simple correlation coefficients were 
calculated for continuous predictors. Results are displayed in Tables 
3 and 4 below. 
Referencing Table 3, highlights include the fact that systems not 
subject to constitutional investment restrictions earned higher 
abnormal returns for each of the three surveys. However, only the 
2001 survey shows a statistically significant result in panel one with 
those systems not having such a constraint earning 372 basis points 
more in risk adjusted returns on average. The second panel shows 
similar information in relation to board purview over investment 
decisions variable. However, while all three surveys have results in 
the expected direction, only the 2000 and 2001 surveys are 
statistically significant with the latter being the most substantive. 
The third panel of Table 3 indicates mixed results for the 
relationship between abnormal return and continuous governance 
practice variables. Specifically, board size (total number of board 
members) is neither statistically nor substantively significant for any 
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TABLE 3 
 Bivariate Results between Abnormal Return  
and Governance Practices 
Panel 1. Constitutional Investment Restrictions 
Survey  Investment 
Restrictions 
(CONST = Yes) 
Investment 
Restrictions 
(CONST = No) 
t-value 
1997 (n = 81) -0.59 0.09 0.56 
2000 (n = 81) -5.13 -2.86 1.32 
2001 (n = 81) 3.62 7.34 1.72 c
Panel 2. Board Purview over Investment Decisions 
Survey Board Invests 
(BRDINV = Yes) 
Board Invests 
(BRDINV = No) 
t-value 
1997 (n = 81) -0.18 0.68 1.26 
2000 (n = 81) -3.79 -.80 2.60 a
2001 (n = 81) 5.57 12.38 5.14 a
Panel 3. Pearson r for Continuous Governance Practices and Abnormal 
Returns  
Survey LNBRD APPT TOTEQ 
1997 (n = 81) 0.10 -0.13 -0.06 
2000 (n = 81) 0.00 -0.18c -0.22b
2001 (n = 81) 0.07 0.08 0.36a
Notes: The reported tests of statistical significance are two tailed. 
a Significant at less than 0.01 level. 
b Significant at less than 0.05 level. 
c Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
of the three surveys and percentage of the board appointed is only 
statistically significant for the 2000 survey. While the percentage of 
the portfolio allocated to equity investments variable is substantively 
significant for both the 2000 and 2001 surveys, the relationship are 
in opposite directions with the latter result being statistically 
significant at less than the one percent level. 
Referencing Table 4, the key elements of interest are that based 
on p < .05, a significant difference exists within comparisons of 
abnormal return among the four categorizations of system size for the 
1997 and 2000 surveys but not the 2001 survey. Furthermore, 
statistically significant differences exist between the smallest systems 
(< 100 Million) and larger systems (1.0 – 9.9 Billion) for the 1997 
survey. For the 1998 survey, statistically significant differences  
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TABLE 4 
One-Way ANOVA Comparison of Abnormal Return Sample Means 
Panel 1. 1997 Survey                                      1996 Abnormal Return a
System Size (SIZE) n M SD 
< 100 Million 12 -1.52 b 2.96 
100 - 999 Million 19 -0.27 2.55 
1.0 – 9.9 Billion 34 0.71b 2.22 
10 + Billion 16 -0.09 1.89 
Panel 2. 2000 Survey                                     1998 Abnormal Return a
System Size (SIZE) n M SD 
< 100 Million 9 -3.45 5.43 
100 - 999 Million 20 -5.24c 4.69 
1.0 – 9.9 Billion 27 -3.19 3.52 
10 + Billion 25 -1.48 c 3.63 
Panel 3. 2001 Survey                                   2000 Abnormal Return 
System Size (SIZE) n M SD 
< 100 Million 7 4.86 7.79 
100 - 999 Million 19 6.23 7.75 
1.0 – 9.9 Billion 28 7.25 6.30 
10 + Billion 27 7.33 6.50 
Notes: Scheffe procedure used to detect differences between groups. 
a Overall F statistic indicates significant differences exist within 
comparisons of abnormal returns among the four different 
categorizations of system size, p < .05. 
b  Third group different from the first group only, p < .10. 
c  Fourth group different from the second group only, p < .05. 
 
appear to have existed between the lower side of medium sized funds 
(100 – 900 Million) and the nation’s largest pensions (10+ Billion). 
Table 4 also appears to mirror the success of the financial markets in 
the latter part of the 1990s as the overall proportion of the 81 
systems with higher levels of assets (10 + Billion) increases over the 
time period being analyzed. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Table 5 below presents results of the multivariate panel data 
analysis. OLS point estimates are given as benchmarks for 
comparisons against the two potential estimations discussed earlier. 
However, given the violations discussed in the econometric 
framework section of this paper their interpretation is problematic. 
And, as noted earlier they are not discussed here.  
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F-Test 
The F-test at the bottom of Table 5 tests the difference in mean 
abnormal return among groups over time. The F values of 0.93 in 
equation one, 0.88 in equation two, and 0.90 in equation three 
indicate that there does not appear to be a significant difference in 
abnormal return across pension funds that are not accounted for by 
the independent variables in each model. 
Regressions and Hausman Specification Test 
Hausman’s specification (Hausman Chi-square) tests whether 
individual effects are correlated with independent variables in a 
model. Referencing the first equation, the null hypothesis that 
individual effects are uncorrelated with regressors is not rejected 
(Hausman Chi-Square = 1.86). This indicates that all of the 
independent variables in the model are free from the impact of 
individual effects and implies that the random effect model is best to 
estimate this equation. The random effect estimation of equation one 
suggests that both constitutional investment restrictions and board 
purview over investment decisions have a direct negative impact on 
financial performance. 
Referencing the second equation, when system size is controlled 
for, the null hypothesis that individual effects are uncorrelated with 
regressors is still not rejected (Hausman Chi-Square = 1.67). Again, 
this indicates that all of the independent variables in the model are 
free from the impact of individual effects and implies that the random 
effect model is best to estimate this equation. An examination of the 
constitutional investment restrictions and board purview coefficients 
reveals little adjustment in terms of magnitude and no change in 
terms of overall levels of statistical significance. 
Referencing the third equation, when the percentage of the 
portfolio in equity investments is controlled for, the null hypothesis 
that individual effects are uncorrelated with regressors is once again 
not rejected (Hausman Chi-Square = 2.19). While both the 
constitutional investment restrictions and board purview coefficients 
remain in a negative direction only board purview over investment 
decisions (BRDINV) remains statistically significant. The magnitude of 
this point estimate throughout the series of equation estimations 
indicates that holding other factors constant, the direct impact is 
approximately 300 basis points whether or not system size and equity 
are controlled for. 
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TABLE 5 
Multivariate Analysis with Abnormal Return Regressed on Governance 
Characteristics (Standard Error) 
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Equation 1d, e
OLS 3.53 
(2.99) 
-1.62 
(1.24) 
-3.05a
(1.05) 
0.27 
(1.25) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
  
Fixed Effect N/A -2.93c
(1.62) 
-3.19b
(1.29) 
2.45 
(1.75) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
  
Random Effect 6.54b
(2.87) 
-2.24b
(1.15) 
-3.16a
(0.95) 
-0.90 
(1.19) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
  
Equation 2d, e
OLS 2.62 
(3.01) 
-1.27 
(1.25) 
-2.84a  
(1.05) 
-0.52 
(1.31) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.83c
(0.45) 
 
Fixed Effect N/A -2.95c
(1.63) 
-3.18b
(1.29) 
-2.48 
(1.77) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.51 
(4.56) 
 
Random Effect 5.07c
(3.00) 
-2.03c
(1.16) 
-3.04a
(0.95) 
-1.36 
(1.24) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.83 
(0.55) 
 
Equation 3d, e
OLS 1.43 
(3.40) 
-1.04 
(1.28) 
-2.77a  
(1.05) 
-0.62 
(1.32) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
0.80c
(0.46) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Fixed Effect N/A -2.39 
(1.68) 
-3.15b  
(1.28) 
-2.83 
(1.78) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.28 
(4.55) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
Random Effect 3.29 
(3.32) 
-1.69 
(1.18) 
-2.98a
(0.95) 
-1.57 
(1.24) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.78 
(0.55) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Notes 
a  Significant at less than 0.01 Level; b Significant at less than 0.05 Level; c 
Significant at less than 0.10 Level.  
d  F test values for mean differences across groups for Equations 1, 2, and 3 
are 0.93, 0.88, and 0.90, respectively.  
e  Hausman Chi-square specification test values for Models 1, 2, and 3 are 
1.86, 1.67, and 2.19, respectively. The null hypothesis is individual effects 
are uncorrelated with other regressors in the model. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, the fixed-effect model is superior to the random-effect model. 
If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the random-effect model is superior 
to the random-effect model. 
 
COMPARISON TO PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Overall, the finding of a direct association between public pension 
fund governance practices and financial performance is consistent 
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with Albrecht and Hingorani’s (2004) study which uses a larger single 
period cross sectional sample. Furthermore, the existing relationships 
appear to be similar in direction and comparable in terms of 
substantive impact. However, there are some divergences when 
discussing statistical significance. 
For example, in their bivariate analysis, Albrecht and Hingorani 
found that systems whose boards had authority over asset allocation 
decisions earned 192 basis points less in 1998 risk adjusted return 
than those systems with trustees not afforded this type of purview. 
The association continued in a multivariate analysis on the same 
criterion which yielded a negative direct point estimate of 136 basis 
points (marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level) for systems 
with boards involved with asset allocation decisions. 
The second panel of Table 3 reflects comparable, although at 
times larger, differences on a related variable over time and the 
random effect estimation procedure suggests that the relationship 
continues in a multivariate framework. The magnitude of the  
“differences” between the two studies may be a reflection of the fact 
that the 2001 survey did not contain separate items for board 
authority over asset allocation decisions and board responsibility for 
directly investing system assets.15 Thus, the somewhat simpler 
variable of board authority over investments may be capturing 
multiple factors. 
Considering other governance variables, the statistically 
insignificant -0.01 coefficient in Table 5 for the percentage of the 
board appointed is similar to Albrecht and Hingorani’s finding of a 
statistically significant -0.02 for the same measure. Furthermore, the 
-1.57 (statistically insignificant) point estimate for board size is in line 
with Albrecht and Hingorani: -1.95 (statistically significant). In terms 
of the random effect estimation procedure, system size in this study 
does not replicate the statistical significance of the previous work 
(0.57 for the natural log for system assets), but the direction is 
comparable. The same conclusion can be reached in terms of 
constitutional investment restrictions. The point estimate is -169 
basis points in the third equation of Table 5 (statistically 
insignificant). By way of comparison, Albrecht and Hingorani found 
that the presence of prudent policies reduced 1998 risk adjusted 
returns by 118 basis points (statistically insignificant).16
A final mention should be made about the lack of evidence in 
Table 5 for a direct impact on abnormal return for the percentage of 
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the portfolio devoted to equity investments. While the direction and 
magnitude is similar to that found by Nofsinger (1998), the result is 
at odds with Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) who find a statistically 
significant coefficient (-0.05) on an identical measure holding other 
factors constant. However, in relation to the overall hypothesis, an 
argument can be made that the statistically insignificant four basis 
point impact, holding other factors constant, is not  as substantive as 
the impact of governance practices on risk adjusted financial 
performance. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study was to extend the work of Albrecht and 
Hingorani (2004) which examined the effects of governance practices 
and investment strategies on state and local government pension 
fund risk adjusted financial performance. In that investigation, the 
researchers tested the mediating “theory” of Useem and Mitchell 
(2000) on a theoretically separate criterion and concluded that direct 
governance practice impacts not only exist but possibly dominate the 
data generation process. 
The results as outlined here provide further evidence of such a 
conclusion and continue to support prior policy recommendations. For 
example, given these results policymakers should reevaluate the 
continuation of board authority over investment decisions and 
perhaps consider more outside managers with greater levels of 
expertise. Barring this, those charged with pension issues should 
consider training for those administrators involved with the 
investment area of pension fund management. 
There is also some evidence to support the reconsideration of 
constitutional investment restrictions and composition of boards of 
trustees. While not statistically significant, both factors are 
substantive enough in terms of basis points to warrant further 
attention. These findings, particularly results pertaining to the 
percentage of the board appointed, should be considered if and when 
the national retirement system is ever allowed to be managed in a 
manner that mimics state and local government pension funds. 
An important question is why a comparison study such as this 
matters? The fundamental answer is that conclusions must be 
interpreted relative to the definition of financial performance. For 
example, total rate of return, as a pension outcome, does not account 
for risk tolerances, liability structures, or value added practices. The 
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decision to use total return is equally critical when considering that 
this outcome variable, in all probability, does include trends occurring 
in the marketplace. Combinations of these factors are likely to 
systematically reflect the influence of attributes, other than that of 
governance characteristics, resulting in a positive bias for those 
systems with higher tolerances for risk. 
A number of writers in the areas of investment management, 
performance measurement, and performance evaluation indicate 
that all of these factors should be considered when making individual 
or peer comparisons and suggest adjusting the total return outcome 
by an appropriate “benchmark return” that ledgers their existence. 
The “abnormal return” measure used here in effect standardizes total 
return by treating risk and liability factors endogenously. Conceptually 
abnormal return is a separate construct of financial performance 
apart from total return. Empirically, the measure is arguably more 
appropriate for peer comparative purposes (Ambachtsheer, 1994, p. 
22).17
Using either measure as a criterion variable implies a separate 
set of inherently valued outcomes if preferences are expressed for 
one type of result over another. For example, the fact that increases 
in investment income from public funds can facilitate improvements 
in pension funding levels, increases in benefits, or decreases in taxes 
is not in dispute. Higher total returns are better outcomes. However, 
in terms of peer comparison, the choice of performance measure 
should reflect assumptions underlying the units of analysis. 
In reality, public pensions are heterogeneous institutions differing 
substantially in liabilities, assets, and funding ratios (GFOA, 2000, p. 
4-6). Well-funded systems with substantial assets and no immediate 
liabilities may prudently incur risk of principal monies in the current 
period by pursuing aggressive investment strategies that bolster total 
return over the long run. However, these same risky strategies are not 
necessarily appropriate for mature systems expecting to pay 
substantial benefits in the near future. In the end this is what we 
hope to have accounted for. 
NOTES 
1.  See Albrecht and Hingorani (2004), page.677. 
2.  Public Pension Coordinating Council, 2001 Survey of State and 
Local Government Employee Retirement Systems, [data on-line]; 
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available from http://ppcc.grsnet.com; accessed 21 February 
2003. 
3.  A poor dichotomous split is defined as such when more than 90 
percent of responses fall into one category. When such a 
condition occurs, the honest correlation between a continuous 
variable and a dichotomous variable is essentially deflated as 
the highest correlation that could be obtained is well below one. 
See, for example, Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) pages 57-58. 
Previously examined governance variables exhibiting this 
condition include whether or not the pension system operates 
under prudent person or prudent expert restrictions, and 
whether or not the system obtains independent performance 
evaluations. The condition was most prevalent for the 2001 
survey.  
4.  For example, items related to board purview over asset 
allocation decisions and direct responsibility for the investment 
of system assets are measured in the 1997 and 2000 surveys 
but not the 2001 survey. 
5.  The other investments category is a single item for the 2001 
survey. For the 1997 and 2000 surveys the other investments 
category included both fixed income and equities as categories. 
Both classes were combined to create a single other 
investments category for each of these surveys. 
6.  Indexes (a), (b), and (h) were obtained from Global Financial 
Data [data on-line]; available from: www.globalfindata.com; 
accessed 05 January 2003. Indexes (c), (d), and (e) were 
obtained from the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund 2000 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Report [report on-line]; 
available from: www.imrf.org; accessed 05 January 2003. The 
index for (f) was obtained from Wilshire Associates Incorporated 
[data on-line]; available from www.wilshire.com; accessed 12 
November 2002. The index for (g), alternative and other 
investments, was created by chain linking quarterly returns for 
the NCREIF property index [data-online]; available from: 
www.ncreif.com; accessed 12 November 2002. 
7.  Beyond empirical findings the expectation is supported by noting 
that such limitations often confound modern investment 
management practices. 
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8.  The expectation is further supported by noting that Albrecht and 
Hingorani (2004) found an inverse relationship between board 
size and financial performance.  
9.  The study does not distinguish between those appointed by a 
governing body (e.g., legislature or council) or Chief Elected 
Official (e.g., Governor or Mayor). The 2001 survey does not 
capture this information beyond those simply appointed.  
10.  The original PPCC measures are denoted as dollar amounts. The 
reason why we measure system size with an ordinal variable is to 
avoid a minimal change in size over time, which may not have 
much impact on return, but may produce a severe consequence 
on a coefficient. The minimal change of asset size over time 
creates a missing time-varying variable in the disturbance of a 
cross-sectional time-series model, which will cause a biased 
coefficient when conducting a multivariate analysis. The actual 
categorizations are identical to those given in all three GFOA 
Survey Reports. 
11.  See, for example: Munnell and Sunden (2000) page 159 and 
pages 163-164. 
12.  The direction of influence would ultimately depend on whether or 
not systems actually capture higher total returns for higher levels 
of assumed risk. If they did not, the influence of equity 
investments on abnormal return (in terms of systematic 
explanation) could be expected to be negative. 
13.  For a complete description of data screening procedures in 
relation to the 2000 Survey see Albrecht (2001) pages 80-88. 
14.  See for example, Hsiao (1986) page 25. 
15.  See note 4 above. 
16.  An important point to note is that Albrecht and Hingorani (2004) 
examined both equity and international strategies. The 
discussion of point estimates here refers to their analysis of 
equity investment strategies only. 
17.  There is no intention of suggesting that abnormal return, as 
defined here, is the best or even most appropriate measure of 
financial performance. Ideally traditional measures of risk such 
as “beta” would be used. However, this is not possible given the 
lack of time series data (Nofsinger, 1998). Our only assertion is 
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that the “abnormal” measure is arguably an improvement to that 
which has already been used. 
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